The Union Army's Unheralded Intelligence Czar (October 2004 | Volume: 55, Issue: 5)

The Union Army's Unheralded Intelligence Czar

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Authors: Stephen Budiansky

Historic Era: Era 5: Civil War and Reconstruction (1850-1877)

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October 2004 | Volume 55, Issue 5

To the student of intelligence history, there has been something eerily familiar in the recent headlines about American intelligence failures. Panels investigating weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the September 11 terrorist attacks have zeroed in on a bugbear that has plagued America’s spy business many times in the past, from the Battle of Bull Run to Pearl Harbor to the Cold War. As John Lehman, a former Secretary of the Navy and a member of the independent 9/11 commission, put it, “We need to ensure the fusion and sharing of all intelligence that could have helped us to avoid 9/11.”

Historical analogies are never, of course, exact. But, in raising the issue of “fusion”—intelli-speak for making sure that intelligence from all sources is brought together, correlated, and cross-checked—Lehman and the 9/11 panel put their finger on a lesson that American intelligence agencies have repeatedly learned, only to forget it and painfully learn again. And that is that some of the worst intelligence debacles occur not because there are no warnings, but because the warnings are misinterpreted, mishandled, or ignored. Or, to use a hackneyed but nonetheless apropos phrase, because the people in charge didn’t “connect the dots.”

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, for example, Secretary of War Henry Stimson brought in a tough-minded New York lawyer, Alfred McCormack, to investigate how the warnings had fallen through the cracks and to recommend new procedures to make sure that such a mistake didn’t happen again. McCormack, armed with a steel-trap mind and an instant commission as a colonel, found that bureaucratic squabbling and rivalries had prevented the sharing of essential information among the different agencies that collected intelligence. Worse, he found that no single office or commander was responsible for making sure that important intelligence even got to the top military and government officials who needed it.

A century before September 11, there was another instance when a few officials had to find out how to make an intelligence system work.

His chief recommendation was that a new “Special Branch” be established. It would receive military, economic, political, and even psychological intelligence about foreign nations, and build a total intelligence picture from all these disparate bits and pieces. Special Branch would every day sift, analyze, and digest all the important incoming reports and distribute its findings directly to top officials.

Staffed with some of the best minds in the American legal profession, whom McCormack had recruited, the Special Service Branch (later renamed the Special Branch) was soon being called by those in the know “the best law office in Washington.” The results were instant and dramatic, and the new system contributed greatly to the success with which intelligence was put to use through the rest of the war - in particular, intelligence from decoded Japanese signals.

But the mistakes that Special Branch was intended to correct were repeated in the immediate postwar period. The establishment of the CIA in 1947, at