FDR: Guilty Short & Kimmel Were Scapegoats (July/August 2001 | Volume: 52, Issue: 5)

FDR: Guilty Short & Kimmel Were Scapegoats

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Authors: David C. Richardson

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July/August 2001 | Volume 52, Issue 5

“Another day of infamy.” By that choice of title in April’s issue, Kevin Baker expresses outrage at recent congressional action designed to restore the reputations of Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel and Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, the commanders in Hawaii at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. Baker states that this action sneaks “a conspiracy theory through the back door of the people’s house,” and in so doing “it sets a sorry precedent.” That theory alleges that President Roosevelt was forewarned of the coming attack. Baker asks: “What is history? It is all that we are now, and all that we believe ourselves to be. If we are to start now tearing ourselves down, knocking apart everything we know to be the truth, not on the basis of any new evidence or research but simply to serve some narrow purpose or ancient grudge, what will be left of us?” Excellent questions, but surprising, especially in light of his earlier comment that “all Washington had to do was to give Pearl Harbor an explicit last-minute warning and Japan’s fleet would have been caught flat-footed, thousands of miles from its home waters.” If Kevin Baker’s history asserts that the commanders in Hawaii could somehow have caught the Japanese flat-footed, then his version of truth sorely needs getting knocked apart.

Let me assure readers at the outset that for every assertion I present as fact, I hold written evidence for those who need to inquire more thoroughly into both the facts and the mystery of what then occurred.

Since Mr. Baker’s column expresses such strong objection to the recent congressional initiative, and the author himself seems preoccupied with blame fixing, I think it would be useful to explain my purpose. My name was mentioned in the congressional amendment; my presentation of the operational realities that bore on what happened on December 7, 1941, was a factor in the congressional decision. Thirty-five years ago, in 1966, I commanded our carrier task forces in the Gulf of Tonkin. I quickly learned that timely intelligence helped accomplish missions and saved lives. I applied that knowledge and preached that gospel while on active duty in three subsequent assignments. In 1982, quite by chance, I had occasion to inquire into events surrounding the Pearl Harbor calamity. It quickly became clear to me that this was the perfect parable to help register in top-level administrative and military minds the fact that high-quality, timely information is essential. My purpose was to teach lessons from past mistakes so as to avoid repeating them; the theory that Roosevelt had been forewarned about the attack was peripheral to this objective.

The date of November 26, 1941, is enormously significant. On that day, over strong objections from Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Harold R. Stark and Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall, the administration issued a virtual ultimatum setting forth conditions that Japan would have to satisfy for the two nations to coexist