Authors:
Historic Era: Era 9: Postwar United States (1945 to early 1970s)
Historic Theme:
Subject:
September 2000 | Volume 51, Issue 5
Authors:
Historic Era: Era 9: Postwar United States (1945 to early 1970s)
Historic Theme:
Subject:
September 2000 | Volume 51, Issue 5
On June 27, 1950, two days after the North Koreans invaded South Korea, I received a memorandum:
Subject: Appointment as Official Spokesman
To: Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny
1. Effective immediately, in addition to your duties as Plans Officer, G-3 Section, FECOM [Far East Command], you will act as my official spokesman.
2. You will brief the press daily, telling them all they need to know and nothing they need not know.
Signed: Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, FECOM
General MacArthur, dissatisfied with the performance of his public relations officer, assigned me the nerve-wracking job of dealing with the press. For the next two months I lost many pounds and almost my mind dealing with the Alsop brothers and other journalists who came to Tokyo to cover the Korean War. I felt nothing but relief when on September 1, 1950, I joined the invasion forces as the engineer of X Corps.
Those “duties as Plans Officer” included working on the Inchon invasion. By late July, the North Koreans had driven the troops of the United States, South Korea, and our other allies into the southern part of Korea.
General MacArthur decided that the best way to avoid abandoning the nation was to mount an invasion on its west coast. He directed the three of us working in the Plans Section to brief him on our individual concepts. One of my colleagues selected the boundary between the opposing forces as the site of the invasion, the textbook solution of attacking the hinge of the two forces; the other chose a site several miles north of the front line where the invading force could receive the benefit of our ground artillery. I picked a spot some 20 miles to the north, believing that the better landing beach and element of surprise would outweigh the benefit of our artillery.
After listening to our presentations in silence, General MacArthur strode to a large map of Korea and, with a heavy marking pen, drew an arrow 100 miles to the north through Inchon to the capital of Seoul, which stood some 20 miles from Inchon on the northern bank of the Han River.
“You are all pusillanimous,” he said. “Always strike for the objective, and the objective here is Korea’s capital. What’s wrong with that?” he asked.
One of us said that the enemy would likely be protecting Seoul, another that the waters around Inchon would be mined. I argued that the 31-foot tide, the second-greatest in the world, would make the landing extremely difficult. General MacArthur ordered us to invade Inchon on September 15, 1950.
Meanwhile, the general faced a more formidable obstacle than us: The Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to the plan. General MacArthur invited them to Tokyo to listen to his concept for