Authors:
Historic Era: Era 4: Expansion and Reform (1801-1861)
Historic Theme:
Subject:
October 1995 | Volume 46, Issue 6
Authors:
Historic Era: Era 4: Expansion and Reform (1801-1861)
Historic Theme:
Subject:
October 1995 | Volume 46, Issue 6
In these fading months of 1995, the political revolt against Washington is still in full cry, and in Washington itself. The congressional drive to return control of many federal regulatory and social welfare programs to the states continues strongly, and my sense of history tells me that we may be in one of those periodically recurring and ever-shifting power struggles between advocates of “centralism” and “localism” that have marked our history ever since the original Federalists and anti-Federalists went at each other.
I admit to being surprised, however, at some of the more vehement manifestations of resistance to the current heavy structure of federal authority. I don’t simply mean the ardent souls who deny federal ownership of public lands, much less the psychopaths who talk of armed resistance. I am referring to the members of 15 state legislatures that have, since 1994, passed resolutions reaffirming—some quite belligerently—the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the states “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution.” Innocuous as these resolutions may sound, they sidestep all the hard questions of 200 years of experience. What are those powers? What do they mean in the 1990s, rather than the 1790s? Who should interpret them? Are state rights the same as state sovereignty? Can such sovereignty be squared with “one nation out of many?”
One early case of acute states’-rights fever was the so-called nullification crisis of 1832–33. The story—a very dramatic one—is worth retelling for the light it sheds on the complexities of the federal system, as well as for its tangy mixture of principle, greed, ambition, and avarice.
In its 1827 and 1828 sessions, Congress was debating upward revision of the tariff in force since the end of the War of 1812. The tariff had raised money for important national projects, such as a national road to the West, and it modestly protected the infant U.S. textile industry. In 1816, few South Carolinians had objected—certainly not John C. Calhoun, the vigorous national-growth advocate, who became vice president to John Quincy Adams in 1825. But the 1820s were not kind to South Carolina. Its plantation economy suffered from a depression, while prospering manufacturers began to ask for still more protection. In the election year of 1828, they got the attention of campaign managers of the candidate Andrew Jackson, and, in the end, they got their high tariff. Jackson won the White House, and Calhoun was again elected vice president, but his position in the administration was made ambiguous by his home state’s discontent.
Some Carolinians had begun to argue that Congress had stuck planters with a so-called Tariff of Abominations that raised their costs for manufactured goods and lowered foreign demand for their rice and cotton. Worse, the Constitution had been stretched out of shape for the purpose. Nowhere was Congress specifically authorized to levy a tariff. That was simply “implied” in the powers to raise revenue and regulate commerce through laws that were, in the elastic phrase, “necessary and