Authors:
Historic Era:
Historic Theme:
Subject:
Spring 2010 | Volume 60, Issue 1
Authors:
Historic Era:
Historic Theme:
Subject:
Spring 2010 | Volume 60, Issue 1
Ten thousand delegates, reporters, and spectators poured into Chicago from 24 different states and territories the second week of May 1860—all fully believing, as one put it, that their choice “would be the next President of the United States.” That year’s Republican convention would prove to be one of the most important political gatherings in U.S. history.
These Republicans, assembling for only their second presidential convention, represented a wildly diverse political party: old Whigs, antislavery former Democrats, high-tariff Easterners, and onetime anti-foreigner Know Nothings. Probably their only point of agreement was that Sen. William H. Seward of New York would be nominated.
Lurking among the likely also-rans were notables such as former Gov. Salmon P. Chase of Ohio, Sen. Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania, and former Rep. Edward Bates of Missouri. But few regarded them as more than regional choices. A few weeks before, former Rep. Abraham Lincoln had won designation as Illinois’s favorite son. But even his 22 pledged delegates did not expect to do more than offer his name in nomination before Seward swept home with far more than the 233 votes needed to carry the 465-delegate convention.
Lincoln has often been portrayed as gaining the White House largely because of the disarray of the opposition party in the general election. Closer examination reveals that his meteoric rise from prairie lawyer to chief executive came as the result of an extraordinary work ethic, canny allegiance building over three decades, and a political team not afraid of a little skullduggery.
As the big event approached, Lincoln described himself as “a little too much of a candidate to go, and not quite enough of a candidate to stay home.” (Candidates were supposed to remain at a dignified distance until, they hoped, a delegation would arrive to announce word of their nomination.) A shrewd headcounter, he calculated that he might receive as many as 100 votes on the first ballot but that it would be “the high-water mark for me.” In his stead he dispatched a team of brilliant, devoted operatives, led by David W. Davis, a man of such immense girth that he uniquely received his own bed at the country inns frequented by attorneys on the state’s judicial circuit.
Davis and his team did not sleep at all, arriving in Chicago four days early to work on swaying votes in the event of a first-ballot deadlock. “We have persistently refused to Suffer your name used for Vice President on any ticket,” Lincoln’s friend William Butler wrote from Chicago. From their headquarters in a parlor at the overflowing Tremont House, Davis bewitched delegates with stories of Lincoln’s honesty, work ethic, rise from poverty, and political moderation (in direct contrast to Seward’s alleged extremism). While Davis did the grunt work, there’s no doubt who designed the strategy. “Our policy,” Lincoln had instructed, “. . . is to give no offence to others—leave them in a good mood to come to us, if they shall be compelled to give up their first